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Independent Audit Committee Members’ Board Tenure and Audit Fees 
 
Abstract 
           This study examines whether independent audit committee members’ board tenure 
affects audit fees.  We find that audit fees are lower for firms with high proportion of 
long board tenure directors on the independent audit committee than for firms with low 
proportion of long board tenure directors on the independent audit committee.  The 
results may suggest that auditors price the monitoring effectiveness arising from long 
board tenure.  The results may also suggest that long board tenure audit committee 
members have a lower demand for audit effort.   
 
Anthony Chan, Guoping Liu, and Jerry Sun. Accounting and Finance 
Forthcoming Pre-print 
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1.        Introduction 
          An important duty of audit committees is to interact with external auditors during 
oversight of financial reporting process (Klein 2002).  As audit committees engage in the 
audit scope negotiation process, their governance quality may affect the audit scope and 
plan, and thus audit fees.  There could be a dual effect of audit committee governance 
quality on audit fees.  On the one hand, high quality audit committees may have a higher 
demand for audit effort, resulting in higher audit fees.  High quality audit committee 
members may have greater incentives to increase the audit scope in order to protect their 
reputational capitals and reduce litigation risks.  Thus, audit committee governance may 
complement to the external audit.  Carcello et al. (2002) examine whether board 
independence affects audit fees.  They find that audit fees are positively associated with 
the proportion of independent directors on the board.  Abbott et al. (2003) investigate the 
relationship between audit fees and audit committee characteristics.  They find that firms 
with fully independent audit committees pay higher fees to auditors than other firms.  
These studies suggest that firms with high governance quality demand more audit effort.  
Likewise, Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) find a positive association between audit 
committee independence and audit fees. 
           On the other hand, high quality audit committees may have a lower supply of audit 
effort or even a lower demand for audit effort, resulting in lower audit fees.  Auditors 
may expend less audit effort when they assign a lower control risk to clients with high 
corporate governance quality.  Meanwhile, high quality audit committee members may 
have less pressure to increase audit effort because they can effectively oversee financial 
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report process themselves.  As opposed to Carcello et al. (2002), Tsui et al. (2001) find 
that audit fees are lower for firms with high board independence than for firms with low 
board independence.  Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) examine the association between 
audit fees and audit committee accounting or financial expertise.  They find that audit 
fees are lower when the audit committee has at least one member with accounting or 
financial expertise.  Their results suggest that audit committee governance may substitute 
to the external audit, contrary to Abbott et al. (2003) and Vafeas and Waegelein (2007).  
Overall, prior research documents mixed evidence on the relationship between audit fees 
and board or audit committee governance.  Thus, it is warranted to conduct more research 
on this issue.   
           This study examines whether independent audit committee members’ board tenure 
affects audit fees.  Since long board tenure outside directors possess greater knowledge 
and experience, they may have higher monitoring effectiveness than other outside 
directors.  However, long board tenure directors are more likely to have friendly 
relationship with managers, which would impair their monitoring effectiveness.  
Empirically, prior research (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2010) documents that outside audit 
committee members’ long board tenure reflects higher monitoring effectiveness.  As long 
board tenure outside directors are more effective monitors, they are likely to demand 
more audit effort to ensure higher monitoring effectiveness and reduce their reputational 
losses.  Thus, audit committee members’ board tenure may be positively associated with 
audit fees.  Nevertheless, auditors may assess clients’ control risks based on audit 
committee effectiveness.  Auditors may price outside directors’ long board tenure as 
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independent audit committee effectiveness.  Moreover, high quality audit committee 
members may have a lower demand for audit effort because of their own monitoring 
effectiveness.  Thus, it is also likely that audit committee members’ board tenure is 
negatively related to audit fees.  
           Using a sample of 1,561 firm-year observations for years 2005 and 2006, we find 
that audit fees are negatively associated with the proportion of long board tenure outside 
directors on the independent audit committee.  The results suggest that auditors may 
assign lower control risks to clients with high proportion of long board tenure audit 
committee members than to clients with low proportion of long board tenure audit 
committee members.  They also suggest that long board tenure audit committee members 
may have a lower demand for audit effort.  Overall, our findings are consistent with the 
notion that audit committee governance may substitute to the external audit.   
           This study contributes to the literature in the following ways.  First, we extend the 
research on the relationship between audit fees and audit committee effectiveness.  
Unlike prior research (Abbott et al. 2003; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2009), this study 
focuses on another facet of audit committee characteristics, namely, audit committee 
members’ board tenure.  We provide further evidence that audit fees decrease in audit 
committee effectiveness.  Second, this study adds to the literature on the monitoring 
effectiveness of long board tenure directors.  Extant studies (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2010; 
Bedard et al. 2004) investigate the effect of audit committees’ board tenure on accounting 
quality.  Our study focuses on the impact of audit committees’ board tenure on audit 
effort.  
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           The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces the 
background and develops the hypothesis.  Section 3 discusses the research design.  
Section 4 presents the empirical results.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.        Background and Hypothesis 
Monitoring Role of Audit Committees  
           Audit committees are operating committees of the board of directors charged with 
oversight of financial reporting process.  Typically, audit committees have 
responsibilities including: (1) overseeing choice of accounting policies and principles, (2) 
hiring external auditors and overseeing the audit process, and (3) monitoring the internal 
control process.  The audit committee plays an important role in the audit scope 
negotiation process (Abbott et al. 2003).  Audit committees are recommended to discuss 
the audit scope and plan with the auditor to check the adequacy of audit coverage.1  
Based on audit committee reports or charters, Carcello et al. (2002) document that the 
audit committee usually reviews the scope of the auditor’s proposed audit plan.  DeZoort 
(1997) finds that audit committee members’ responses to the survey indicate that a 
primary audit committee duty is to review the external auditor’s work, suggesting that the 
audit committee is actively involved in external audit tasks.   
           Carcello and Neal (2000) document that the external auditor is more likely to issue 
a going-concern report for firms experiencing financial distress when the firms have 
higher audit committee independence.  Klein (2002) finds that audit committee 
                                                 
1
             Refer to the Public Oversight Board (1993), In the Public Interest: A Special Report by the Public 
Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section and the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999), Audit Committee 
Characteristics and Restatements: A Study of the Efficacy of Certain Blue Ribbon Committee 
Recommendations.  
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independence and board independence are negatively associated with earnings 
management.  Abbott et al. (2004) find that the likelihood of financial restatement is less 
for firms with high audit committee independence than for firms with low audit 
committee independence.  These studies suggest that independent directors can 
effectively oversee financial reporting.  It is also found that audit committee 
independence and board independence are positively associated with audit fees (Carcello 
et al. 2002; Abbott et al. 2003), suggesting that independent directors demand a high 
level of audit coverage in order to enhance accounting quality.  Thus, the proportion of 
independent directors on the audit committee reflects the effectiveness of audit 
committees.   
           As a reaction to highly profiled corporate and accounting scandals including Enron, 
Tyco International, and WorldCom, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was signed 
into a U.S. federal law on July 30, 2002.  The SOX had an unprecedented impact on 
corporate governance practices including audit committees.  The SOX increased audit 
committees’ responsibilities and authority and considerably affected the role of audit 
committees in the external audit.  The SOX requires audit committees to: (1) preapprove 
audit and nonaudit services, (2) receive auditors’ reports on critical accounting policies, 
discussions with management on alternative GAAP, the auditor’s preference, and the 
material communications between the auditor and management, and (3) oversee the 
auditor engagement.    
           The SOX also heightens and impacts the membership criteria of audit committees.  
Under the SOX, audit committee members must be independent directors.  In line with 
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the SOX, the U.S. stock exchanges additionally require that there should be at least one 
audit committee member who has accounting or financial expertise for U.S. listed 
companies.2  As a result of all audit committee members being independent directors, the 
proportion of independent directors on the audit committee has been an obsolete measure 
of audit committee effectiveness.  However, there still would be variation in governance 
quality among audit committees even though all audit committee members are 
independent directors.  Therefore, it is of practical value to further explore audit 
committee members’ characteristics that affect audit committee effectiveness. 
                      
Audit Fees and Corporate Governance 
           Simunic (1980) finds that audit fees are higher for large size clients and clients 
with great complexity of business, suggesting that audit fees reflect audit effort.  By 
expending much effort on auditing, auditors can improve clients’ financial reporting 
quality to reduce their reputational and litigation risks.  Frankel et al. (2002) find that 
firms are more likely to meet earnings benchmarks when they have high percentile ranks 
of audit fees.  They also find that the percentile rank of audit fees is negatively associated 
with the magnitude of discretionary accruals.  Ashbaugh et al. (2003) find that the 
occurrence of small earnings increase is less for firms with high audit fees than for firms 
with low audit fees.  Based on latent class mixture models, Larcker and Richardson (2004) 
also document a negative association between audit fees and total accruals.  These results 
suggest that spending more audit effort can constrain earnings management.   Srinidhi 
                                                 
2
             Refer to NYSE Corporate Governance 303A.05, NASDAQ Rule 4350 (c), and AMEX Enhanced 
Corporate Governance Rules Sec 805.   
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and Gul (2007) examine the effect of audit fees on accrual quality.  They find that audit 
fees are positively associated with accrual quality, suggesting that audit fees may reflect 
effort, which in turn reduces estimation errors and enhances accrual quality. 
           External auditing is an important corporate governance mechanism.  Several 
extant studies investigate the relationships between audit fees and other corporate 
governance mechanisms.   Carcello et al. (2002) examine the association between board 
characteristics and audit fees.  On the one hand, they argue that high quality boards 
would be more concerned with effectively fulfilling its monitoring duties and thus would 
be more supportive of external auditing.   These boards are more willing to increase audit 
scope, resulting in higher audit fees.  Thus, there could be a positive association between 
board governance quality and audit fees.  On the other hand, Carcello et al. (2002) 
contend that high board governance quality may reduce the auditor’s assessment of 
control risk as board governance may substitute to external auditing, which may decrease 
audit effort and thus audit fees.  Consistent with the argument on the positive impact of 
board governance on audit effort, Carcello et al. (2002) document that audit fees increase 
in board independence in U.S.  This suggests that outside directors may demand for more 
audit effort to protect corporate stakeholders and themselves.       
           Abbott et al. (2003) examine the association between audit committee 
characteristics and audit fees.  They find that audit fees are higher when firms have a 
fully independent audit committee.  They also find that audit fees are higher for firms 
with at least one accounting or financial expert on the audit committee than for firms 
without accounting or financial experts on the audit committee.  Their results show that 
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not only directors’ independence but also directors’ competence can increase audit scope.  
Audit committee members with accounting experience may make judgments more 
similar to auditors.  Knapp (1987) suggests that auditors are more likely to discuss 
accounting issues with knowledgeable audit committees.  In addition, audit committee 
members with accounting experience may be more likely to understand the importance of 
external auditing than audit committee members without accounting experience.  
Therefore, from the perspective of both auditors and audit committees, audit committees’ 
accounting or financial expertise can induce audit effort.  Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) 
also examine the relationship between audit committee characteristics and audit fees.  
Similarly, they find that audit committee independence is positively associated with audit 
fees.  In addition, they find that audit committee size and the proportion of audit 
committee members who serve on the audit committee of another Fortune 500 firm are 
positively related to audit fees.  
           Nevertheless, audit fees are likely to be lower for firms with high board or audit 
committee effectiveness than for firms with low board or audit committee effectiveness if 
auditors price corporate governance quality or if high quality directors have a lower 
demand for audit effort.  Bedard and Johnstone (2004) investigate the effect of earnings 
manipulation risk and corporate governance risk on auditors’ planning and pricing 
decisions.  They suggest that inadequate corporate governance may increase audit effort 
and billing rates.   Using a sample of firms in Hong Kong, Tsui et al. (2001) find that 
audit fees are negatively associated with board independence, inconsistent with U.S. 
evidence documented by Carcello et al. (2002).  This suggests that board governance may 
9 
 
substitute rather than complement to the external audit.   Recently, Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2009) revisit the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and 
audit fees.  As opposed to Abbott et al. (2003), they find that audit fees are negatively 
associated with the accounting or financial expertise of the audit committee.  Their results 
may suggest that auditors price audit committee effectiveness because it is related to the 
control risk and thus the overall audit risk or that audit committee members with 
accounting experience have a lower demand for the external audit.  
           In summary, on the one hand, high quality boards or audit committees are more 
willing to increase audit effort to protect their reputational capitals and reduce their 
litigation risks.  Thus, board or audit committee effectiveness may positively affect audit 
fees.  On the other hand, auditors may be more willing to expend audit effort when 
clients’ board or audit committee effectiveness is low or high quality directors may have 
less pressure to increase audit effort because of their own monitoring effectiveness.  
These may lead to a negative association between board or audit committee effectiveness 
and audit fees.  Empirically, there is mixed evidence on the relationship between board or 
audit committee effectiveness and audit fees. 
 
Board Tenure of Audit Committee Members and Hypothesis 
           Independent directors with long board tenure have greater experience and 
expertise in monitoring financial reporting process.  Usually, work experience can 
improve job performance as experience is the job-relevant knowledge gained over time 
(Fiedler 1970).  Herz and Schultz (1999) suggest that procedure knowledge is important 
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in dealing with accounting issues.3  Quinones et al. (1995) argue that procedural 
knowledge can be learned "on-the-job" and thus increases in work experience.  Long 
board tenure outside directors are more likely to acquire the procedural knowledge as a 
result of work experience.  Since outside directors are less informed than inside directors, 
their monitoring effectiveness may depend on the usefulness of information they can 
receive.  Long board tenure directors can gain much knowledge of the company’s internal 
control system and business operations over time, and can also establish working 
relationships with the management to acquire more useful information for their 
judgments on accounting issues.  
            Long board tenure outside directors have greater reputational capitals that have 
been developed over time.  Those directors are more concerned with their job 
performance since the poor job performance will damage their reputation.  Salancik 
(1977) theoretically shows that people’s actions become more committing if the 
revocability of the actions is lower.  O’Reilly and Caldwell (1981) document that 
behavioral commitment is significantly associated with job turnover.  Long board tenure 
outside directors are less likely to reverse their job acceptance as they may have high job 
satisfactions.  Long board tenure may increase outside directors’ commitment to fulfill 
their duties.  In summary, long board tenure outside directors may have greater 
experience, expertise, reputation, commitment, and willingness to performance better.  
Thus, an independent audit committee with longer tenure directors may have higher 
monitoring effectiveness. 
                                                 
3
            Procedural knowledge is the knowledge of the steps involved in actually performing a task, such as 
solving a particular type of problem or analyzing a particular issue. 
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           In the literature, several studies have documented evidence on the positive 
relationship between directors’ board tenure and their monitoring effectiveness.  Beasley 
(1996) examines the association between board characteristics and the likelihood of 
financial reporting fraud.  He finds that financial reporting fraud is less likely to occur for 
firms with long average tenure of outside directors than for firms with short average 
tenure of outside directors.  Bedard et al. (2004) investigate the effect of audit committee 
characteristics on earnings management.  They document some evidence that earnings 
management is negatively associated with average board tenure of outside directors on 
the audit committee.  Recently, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that accrual quality is 
positively associated with average board tenure of audit committee members, suggesting 
that long tenure outside directors are more effective in oversight of financial reporting.   
           However, long board tenure outside directors may have a friendly relationship 
with the management, which could be developed over time.  Since the management may 
be involved in the nomination process of outside directors, outside directors who have 
strong personal ties with the management are more likely to be re-appointed and survive 
long term.  Those directors’ independence could be impaired by their amiable 
relationship with managers.  Moreover, long board tenure directors are less mobile and 
less employable, and lack new insights and solutions to the company’s issues (Vafeas 
2003; Canavan et al. 2004).  Thus, it is possible that the positive effect of long board 
tenure on monitoring effectiveness is offset by its negative effect.  Vafeas (2003) finds 
that compensation committees with long board tenure directors pay a higher CEO salary 
to CEOs than all others, suggesting that those directors may be less effective in 
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monitoring CEO compensation.   Overall, extant research shows that the positive effect 
of long board tenure on monitoring effectiveness dominates over the negative effect of 
long board tenure on monitoring effectiveness, especially in overseeing financial 
reporting process.  
           Given that long board tenure outside directors have higher governance quality, 
they may be more concerned with reputational capitals and thus demand for more audit 
effort, which means that the external audit may complement to audit committee 
governance.  Thus, there could be a positive association between the proportion of long 
board tenure directors on the independent audit committee and audit fees.   
           On the other hand, auditors may price audit committee effectiveness, namely, 
audit committee governance may substitute to external audit.  In this case, auditors may 
expend less effort on clients with more long board tenure directors on the independent 
audit committee if long tenure directors have higher monitoring effectiveness.  Moreover, 
long board tenure directors may have a lower demand for audit effort.  Thus, there could 
also be a negative association between the proportion of long board tenure directors on 
the independent audit committee and audit fees.  We formulate the unsigned hypothesis 
as follows: 
H1:    Audit fees are significantly associated with the proportion of long board tenure 
directors on the independent audit committee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
3.        Research Design 
Sample Selection 
           We select sample firms from the IRRC database for years 2005 and 2006.4  The 
IRRC database provides the data of directors including affiliation, board tenure, 
additional board seats, shareholding, etc.  We find that there are 26,947 director-year 
observations in the IRRC database for years 2005 and 2006.  The average board tenure of 
directors is 9.51 years, while the median and the 75th quartile of board tenure are 7 and 13 
years, respectively.  We review proxy statements downloaded from the EDGAR to 
manually collect the data on audit committee members’ accounting or financial expertise, 
which are not provided by the IRRC database.   We then collect the data of audit fees 
from the Compustat Audit Fees database and the financial statement data from the 
Compustat North America database.  After the exclusion of observations with missing 
data, the final sample consists of 1,561 firm-year observations for years 2005 and 2006.  
 
Model 
          We estimate the following regression model to test the hypothesis: 
AUDFEE = b0 + b1LNTDIR + b2ACEDIR + b3OTHDIR + b4BLKDIR + b5ACSIZE  
                   + b6BDIND + b7BDSIZE + b8 FSIZE + b9 SEGMT + b10FOREIGN + b11LOSS  
                   + b12DEBT + b13ROA + b14 RECINT + b15 INVINT + ε                     (1) 
where 
AUDFEE = the log value of the sum of the fees of auditing financial statements and other  
                    audit related fees, 
                                                 
4
             The latest data year of the IRRC database that we used is 2006.  
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    LNTDIR = the proportion of long board tenure directors on the audit committee,  
   ACEDIR = the proportion of directors with accounting expertise on the audit committee,  
  OTHDIR = the proportion of directors on the audit committee, who hold three or more  
                    additional board seats in other firms,          
  BLKDIR = the proportion of  blockholding directors on the audit committee, who hold  
                    five or more percent of ownership (Klein 2002), 
   ACSIZE = audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the audit  
                    committee, 
   BDIND = board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors on  
                    the board,  
   BDSIZE = board size, measured as the number of directors on the board, 
      FSIZE = firm size, measured as the log of total assets, 
    SEGMT = the log value of the number of business segments (Larcker and Richardson  
                    2004), 
FOREIGN = the ratio of foreign sales to total sales, 
        LOSS = a dummy coded 1 if net income is negative and 0 otherwise, 
       DEBT = debt ratio, measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
 
         ROA = return on assets, measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary items  
                     to total assets, 
   RECINT = receivables intensiveness, measured as the ratio of receivables to total assets, 
     INVINT= inventory intensiveness, measured as the ratio of inventory to total assets. 
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           Long board tenure directors are directors with the board tenure of 10 or more years.  
We define long board tenure directors by using 10 years of board service time in a firm as 
the cut-off point because this level is close to the average tenure of directors.  We also 
use alternative cut-off points to define long board tenure directors in additional analyses.  
We expect that the coefficient on LNTDIR will be significantly positive or negative) if the 
hypothesis is supported.  
           As in Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008), we define directors with accounting or 
financial expertise as directors who are or were certified public accountants, auditors, 
principal or chief financial officers, controllers, or principal or chief accounting officers.  
Abbott et al. (2003) document a positive association between audit fees and audit 
committees’ accounting or financial expertise.  Thus, we expect a positive coefficient on 
ACEDIR.  Bedard et al. (2004) suggest that directors who serve on additional boards have 
greater expertise and reputation to work well.  However, Core et al. (1999) argue that 
those directors are busy and thus may have lower governance quality.  We do not expect 
the sign of the coefficient on OTHDIR.  Directors with high additional directorship are 
defined as those who hold at least three additional board seats (Shivdasani 1993).  
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest that directors with high stock ownership could 
have stronger incentives to monitor the CEO.  Klein (2002) finds that outside directors 
with block shareholding more effectively constrain earnings management.  Thus, the 
coefficient on BLKDIR is expected to be positive given that blockholding directors have a 
higher demand for audit effort.   
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           Bushman et al. (2004) assert that small size boards have the disadvantage of fewer 
advisors and monitors of management.  Therefore, it is likely that large size audit 
committees or boards have higher governance quality.  We expect that the coefficients on 
both ACSIZE and BDSIZE are positive if large size audit committees induce greater audit 
effort.  We include BDIND in the model since Carcello et al. (2002) find that audit fees 
are positively associated with board independence.  
           Based on prior research into audit fees (Carcello et al. 2002; Abbott et al. 2003; 
Larcker and Richardson 2004), we include several control variables in the model.  We 
expect that the coefficients on FSIZE, SEGMT, FOREIGN, LOSS, RECINT, and INVINT 
are positive, while the coefficient on ROA is negative.  Firms with high financial leverage 
may have high insolvency risks, thus resulting in high audit fees.  However, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that financial leverage can reduce agency costs, which may lead 
to a lower demand for corporate governance.  Thus, it is unclear whether audit fees are 
positively or negatively associated with financial leverage.  We do not predict the sign of 
the coefficient on DEBT.  
 
4.        Empirical Results 
           Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of variables.  On average, 29% of audit 
committee members have the board tenure of 10 or more years.  43% of audit committees 
have at least one member with accounting or financial expertise.  9% of audit committee 
members hold three or more additional board seats in other firms.  There are only 0.2% of 
audit committee members who hold five or more percent of ownership.   The average size 
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of audit committees is three members.  Approximate 72% of board members are 
independent directors.  Usually, the board has nine members.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
           Table 2 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients between independent 
variables.  The maximum absolute value of the coefficients is 0.627 between LOSS and 
ROA as both of them reflect earnings performance.5   Overall, there are no extremely high 
correlations between the independent variables.  Thus, it is less likely that 
multicollinearity is a substantive issue in the analyses.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
           Table 3 presents the results of the main regression.  We find that the coefficient on 
LNTDIR is negative and significant (t-statistic = -3.32, p-value<0.01).  These results 
show that audit fees are lower when more long board tenure directors sit on the audit 
committee.  The results may suggest that auditors price independent audit committees’ 
long board tenure as they assign lower control risk to clients with higher audit committee 
effectiveness.  Our findings may also suggest that audit committee members with long 
board tenure demand a lower quantity of audit effort from the external auditor because 
they can effectively oversee financial reporting process themselves.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
           We also find that audit committee members’ accounting or financial expertise is 
not significantly related to audit fees, inconsistent with prior research (Abbott et al. 2003; 
Vafeas and Waegelein 2007;  Krishnan and Visvanathan 2009).  The inconsistency could 
                                                 
5
            We find similar results if we drop either LOSS or ROA from the model. 
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be due to the following reasons.  First, there is no specific definition of a director’s 
accounting or financial expertise in the corporate governance standards issued by the U.S. 
stock exchanges.  Thus, listed companies can identify a director as an accounting or 
financial expert based on their own criteria, which may be different from our definition of 
expertise.  Moreover, these self-identified experts may work as well as our defined 
experts, resulting in no significant difference in accounting or financial expertise between 
audit committees.  Second, the disclosure of directors’ accounting or financial expertise 
in proxy statements is voluntary rather than mandatory.  Therefore, it is difficult to 
accurately measure directors’ accounting or financial expertise based on a specific 
definition.   
           The results in Table 3 indicate that audit committee members’ additional 
directorship in other firms is not significantly associated with audit fees.  If additional 
directorship can reflect directors’ expertise and reputational capital, audit committees 
with high additional directorship may demand for more audit effort.  Nevertheless, 
directors with high additional directorship are also regarded as busy directors, who may 
less effectively monitor financial reporting process, resulting in lower audit fees.  Thus, 
the positive effect of additional directorship on audit fees could be offset by its negative 
effect.  We find that audit committee members’ blockholding is also not significantly 
related to audit fees.  A concern on this measure is that most of audit committee members 
are not block shareholders.  The lower variation in this measure may reduce the statistical 
power of testing this audit committee characteristic.  
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           We also find that audit committee size is not significantly related to audit fees.  
This is inconsistent with Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) that document a positive 
association between audit committee size and audit fees.  We note that Vafeas and 
Waegelein (2007) focus on Fortune 500 firms whose average audit committee size is four 
members.  However, this study’s average audit committee size is three members because 
our sample includes non-Fortune 500 firms.  This suggests that the results on audit 
committee size may be subject to firm size.  As expected, we document that both board 
independence and board size are positively associated with audit fees.  These results 
suggest that high quality boards demand for more audit effort from the external auditor.  
In addition, we find that audit fees are positively associated with firm size, the number of 
business segments, foreign operations, loss-making, and receivables intensiveness, and 
are negatively associated with financial leverage and return on assets.  A negative 
relationship between financial leverage and audit fees suggests that a lower demand for 
oversight by firms with high financial leverage may lead to a lower demand for audit 
effort.  
           We conduct the following additional analyses to test the robustness of our results.  
First, we estimate regression model (1) for years 2005 and 2006, separately.  Columns 3 
and 4 in Table 4 report the results based on the data for 2005.  We find that audit fees are 
negatively associated with the proportion of long-term board tenure directors on the audit 
committee (t-statistic = -2.39, p-value<0.01).  Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4 include the 
results based on the data for 2006.  We still find that the coefficient on LNTDIR is 
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significant and negative (t-statistic = -2.26, p-value<0.01).  Overall, the results of yearly 
regressions are similar to the results of the pooled regression.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
           Second, we examine whether audit committee members’ average board tenure 
affects audit fees.6  If long board tenure directors on the audit committee have a lower 
supply of audit effort or a lower demand for audit effort, we expect a negative association 
between audit committee members’ average board tenure and audit fees.  We estimate 
model (1) by replacing LNTDIR with ABDTEN (i.e., audit committee members’ average 
board tenure).  Table 5 provides the results on average board tenure.  We also find that 
the coefficient on ABDTEN is significant and negative (t-statistic = -2.64, p-value<0.01).  
This suggests that audit committee members with long length of board tenure may have a 
lower supply of or demand for audit effort from the external auditor.  These results are 
consistent with the results based on the proportion of long-term board tenure directors on 
the audit committee.   
Insert Table 5 about here 
           Third, we test the sensitivity of using alternative cut-off points of board tenure in 
defining long-term board tenure directors to our results.  We choose two alternative cut-
off points including the median and the 75th quartile (i.e., Q3) of board tenure.  Columns 
3 and 4 in Table 6 show the results when the median of board tenure is used as the cut-off 
point.  We find that audit fees are negatively associated with LNTDIR (t-statistic = -1.78, 
p-value<0.05).   The results of using the 75th quartile as the cut-off point are reported in 
                                                 
6
           Using average board tenure instead of the proportion of long-term board tenure directors can avoid 
the arbitrariness of choosing the cut-off level for defining long-term board tenure directors.  
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Columns 5 and 6 in Table 6.  Likewise, we document a negative and significant 
coefficient on LNTDIR (t-statistic = -2.14, p-value<0.01).  Thus, our results are robust to 
using these two alternative cut-off points of board tenure. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
5.        Conclusion 
           This study examines the relationship between independent audit committee 
members’ board tenure and audit fees.  We find that audit fees are lower for firms with 
high proportion of long board tenure outside directors on the independent audit 
committee than for firms with low proportion of long board tenure outside directors on 
the independent audit committee.  The results suggest that auditors may price the 
monitoring effectiveness arising from long board tenure or that long board tenure audit 
committee members have a lower demand for audit effort.  Our findings also indicate that 
audit committee governance may substitute to the external audit.   
           This study has its own caveats.  We employ the data on audit committees from the 
IRRC database that generally includes large firms.  As audit committee effectiveness may 
be affected by firm size, it is unclear whether our results can be generalized for small 
firms.  Future research on audit committees may consider small firms in the sample.  
Moreover, while we control for several audit committee members’ characteristics in the 
analyses, which are confined to the IRRC database, it is still likely that some governance 
quality related characteristics are omitted in the model.  Thus, it is worth conducting 
more investigation of audit committee members’ characteristics in the future. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables 
(N= 1,561) 
      
Variable Mean Median Std Q1  Q3 
AUDFEE 7.788 7.666 1.007 7.062 8.407 
LNTDIR 0.293 0.333 0.292 0.000 0.500 
ACEDIR 0.427 0.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 
OTHDIR 0.093 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.167 
BLKDIR 0.002 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 
ACSIZE 3.172 3.000 1.125 2.000 4.000 
BDIND 0.715 0.727 0.143 0.625 0.833 
BDSIZE 9.174 9.000 2.133 8.000 11.000 
FSIZE 7.667 7.495 1.488 6.587 8.568 
SEGMT 0.976 1.099 0.740 0.000 1.609 
FOREIGN 0.264 0.190 0.266 0.000 0.467 
LOSS 0.094 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.000 
DEBT 0.165 0.144 0.148 0.018 0.262 
ROA 0.060 0.057 0.066 0.031 0.096 
RECINT 0.150 0.131 0.107 0.075 0.194 
INVINT 0.115 0.087 0.119 0.017 0.166 
 
 
   AUDFEE = the log value of the sum of the fees of auditing financial statements and other audit related  
                       fees, 
    LNTDIR = the proportion of long-term directors on the audit committee,  
   ACEDIR = the proportion of directors with accounting expertise on the audit committee,  
   OTHDIR = the proportion of directors on the audit committee, who hold three or more additional board  
                      seats in other firms,          
   BLKDIR = the proportion of  blockholding directors on the audit committee, who hold five or more  
                     percent of ownership (Klein, 2002), 
    ACSIZE = audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the audit committee, 
    BDIND = board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors on the board,  
   BDSIZE = board size, measured as the number of directors on the board, 
      FSIZE = firm size, measured as the log of total assets, 
    SEGMT = the log value of the number of business segments (Larcker and Richardson, 2004), 
FOREIGN = the ratio of foreign sales to total sales, 
        LOSS = a dummy coded 1 if net income is negative and 0 otherwise, 
       DEBT = debt ratio, measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
         ROA = return on assets, measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets, 
   RECINT = receivables intensiveness, measured as the ratio of receivables to total assets, 
     INVINT= inventory intensiveness, measured as the ratio of inventory to total assets. 
 
  
                       
BLKDIR ACSIZE BDIND BDSIZE FSIZE SEGMT FOREIGN LOSS DEBT ROA RECINT INVINT 
 -0.011   -0.001  -0.097*** -0.042* -0.025 0.008     0.026 -0.010  -0.073*** 0.005  0.082*** -0.084*** 
0.003    0.177*** 0.041 0.028 -0.034 -0.043* 0.023 -0.021 0.063** -0.005 0.034 -0.022 
-0.020 0.060**    0.083*** 0.104*** 0.160*** 0.061** 0.042* 0.008  0.041 -0.014 -0.021 -0.021 
 -0.016  -0.035 -0.043* -0.077*** -0.073*** -0.007 -0.001 -0.053** 0.036   -0.003 -0.009 
  0.178*** 0.343*** 0.281*** 0.170*** -0.015 -0.043* 0.077** -0.001 0.064** -0.015 
   0.075*** 0.147*** 0.144*** 0.131*** 0.018 0.105*** -0.042* 0.048* 0.023 
    0.581*** 0.245*** -0.002 -0.066*** 0.178*** -0.045* -0.005 -0.036 
     0.322*** 0.061** 0.224*** -0.008 -0.055** -0.103*** -0.117*** 
      0.033 0.120*** -0.088*** 0.140*** -0.101*** -0.022 
       0.090*** -0.148*** -0.013 0.192*** -0.016 
        0.130*** -0.627*** 0.004 0.028 
         -0.288*** -0.144*** -0.136*** 
          -0.028 0.063** 
           0.030 
            
***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
  
Table 3.   Main regression 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 3.139 31.34*** 
LNTDIR ? -0.148 -3.32*** 
ACEDIR + 0.003 0.12           
OTHDIR ? 0.067 0.93 
BLKDIR + 0.229 0.63 
ACSIZE + -0.002 -0.18 
BDIND + 0.429 4.62*** 
BDSIZE + 0.014 1.91** 
FSIZE + 0.483 42.94*** 
SEGMT + 0.190 10.16*** 
FOREIGN + 0.984 19.58*** 
LOSS + 0.169 2.96*** 
DEBT ? -0.189 -1.98** 
ROA - -0.742 -2.88*** 
RECINT + 1.077 8.66*** 
INVINT + 0.056 0.51 
    
N                        1,561 
F-statistic              318.94*** 
Adj. R2                            75.59% 
 
*** and ** indicate significance at the level of 1% and 5%, respectively (one-tailed tests). 
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Table 4.   Yearly regression 
    
   
Year         2005            2006 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 3.121 21.68***  3.150  22.12*** 
LNTDIR ? -0.160 -2.39***  -0.136 -2.26*** 
ACEDIR + 0.014 0.37            -0.005 -0.13           
OTHDIR ? 0.079 0.72  0.057 0.59 
BLKDIR + 0.248 0.32  0.255 0.62 
ACSIZE + 0.004 0.20  -0.004 -0.21 
BDIND + 0.399 2.98***  0.457 3.46*** 
BDSIZE + 0.014 1.29*  0.014 1.29* 
FSIZE + 0.480 29.64***  0.484 30.61*** 
SEGMT + 0.191 7.19***  0.191 7.13*** 
FOREIGN + 1.020 14.31***  0.948 13.19*** 
LOSS + 0.148 1.83**  0.198 2.41*** 
DEBT ? -0.115 -0.85  -0.262 -1.93** 
ROA - -0.562 -1.58*  -0.961 -2.53*** 
RECINT + 1.051 5.96***  1.110 6.26*** 
INVINT + 0.094 0.61  0.013 0.08 
N   
                     
812 
 
 
                     
749 
F-statistic     156.60***     159.53*** 
Adj. R2         74.21%       76.07% 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (one-tailed tests). 
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Table 5.    Results on audit committee members’ average board tenure 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 3.216 28.41*** 
ABDTEN ? -0.065 -2.64*** 
ACEDIR + 0.003 0.13           
OTHDIR ? 0.076 1.06 
BLKDIR + 0.213 0.59 
ACSIZE + 0.001 0.09 
BDIND + 0.431 4.63*** 
BDSIZE + 0.015 1.95** 
FSIZE + 0.482 42.81*** 
SEGMT + 0.190 10.16*** 
FOREIGN + 0.980 19.48*** 
LOSS + 0.171 2.99*** 
DEBT ? -0.189 -1.98** 
ROA - -0.720 -2.79*** 
RECINT + 1.065 8.57*** 
INVINT + 0.058 0.53 
    
N                        1,561 
F-statistic              317.83*** 
Adj. R2                            75.29% 
 
*** and ** indicate significance at the level of 1% and 5%, respectively (one-tailed tests). 
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Table 6.    Results on alternative cut-off points of board tenure 
    
   
Cut-off level         Median            Q3  
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 3.113 30.68***  3.107 31.13*** 
LNTDIR ? -0.074 -1.78**  -0.111 -2.14*** 
ACEDIR + 0.005 0.19            0.010 0.36           
OTHDIR ? 0.076 1.06  0.071 0.98 
BLKDIR + 0.227 0.62  0.227 0.62 
ACSIZE + -0.002 -0.16  -0.004 -0.29 
BDIND + 0.446 4.80***  0.439 4.71*** 
BDSIZE + 0.015  1.98**  0.015 1.92** 
FSIZE + 0.482 42.73***  0.483 42.88*** 
SEGMT + 0.189 10.09***  0.191 10.20*** 
FOREIGN + 0.980 19.46***  0.981 19.48*** 
LOSS + 0.171 2.98***  0.171 2.98*** 
DEBT ? -0.179 -1.87**  -0.188 -1.96** 
ROA - -0.722 -2.80***  -0.742 -2.87*** 
RECINT + 1.066 8.54***  1.056 8.50*** 
INVINT + 0.063 0.57  0.072 0.66 
N   
                       
1,561 
 
 
                     
1,561 
F-statistic     316.80***     317.18*** 
Adj. R2         75.23%       75.25% 
 
*** and ** indicate significance at the level of 1% and 5%, respectively (one-tailed tests). 
 
 
 
 
 
